We investigate how to model indifference with choice functions. We take the coherence axioms for choice functions proposed by Seidenfeld, Schervisch and Kadane as a source of inspiration, but modify them to strengthen the connection with desirability. We discuss the properties of choice functions that are coherent under our modified set of axioms and the connection with desirability. Once this is in place, we present an axiomatisation of indifference in terms of desirability. On this we build our definition of indifference in terms of choice functions, which we discuss in some detail.
INTRODUCTION
The fundamental problem of study in decision theory is how to make a choice from within a set of available options. Rubin [21] proposed a theory of choice functions based on choices between more than two elements, where an agent determines which are the optimal ones for any input set. He started from von Neumann and Morgenstern's [33] axiomatisation of choices based on pairwise comparisons between the options.
One aspect of Rubin's axiomatisation is that the agent is assumed to be able to make a comparison between any pair of options (either one of them is strictly preferred to the other or they are indifferent). As a consequence, he is assumed to be indifferent between any two options chosen from a given set. However, the agent may be undecided between two options without being indifferent between them, particularly when the information available does not allow for a complete comparison of the options; this will for instance typically be the case when there is no relevant information available at all. This is one of the motivations for a theory of imprecise probabilities [34] , where incomparability and indifference are distinguished. This point was also discussed by Kadane et al. [16] (and also [27] ), who generalised Rubin's axioms [21] in order to allow for incomparability. One interesting aspect of their take on choice functions is that it does not require any predefined utility.
Imprecise probability is an umbrella term for mathematical models that are meant to be used in situations of imprecise or incomplete information, where it may not be possible (or advisable) to use (precise) probabilities. In particular, it covers sets of probability measures and various types of non-additive measures and functionals, such as coherent lower previsions, belief functions and possibility measures. All of these models can be expressed in terms of coherent sets of desirable gambles [19, 34, 35] , which encode the gambles that a subject, whose beliefs we want to model, strictly prefers to the status quo. One of their advantages is that they avoid problems with conditioning on events of probability zero. They can be-and have been-used to replace probabilities in Bayesian networks, for predictive inference, and so on [5, 7, 11, 13, 18] .
Sets of desirable gambles are typically a binary concept: they are characterised by pairwise comparisons between the available options, whereas in practice choice may be more complex. Choice functions based on binary comparisons only may represent behaviour that is considered to be paradoxical by some [3, 14, 22] . One of the aims of this paper is to study how the more general-not necessarily binary-choice functions relate to the sets of desirable gambles that are now more commonly used in imprecise probabilities papers.
In order to establish such a relationship, we must pay some attention at this point to the options that subjects choose between on both approaches: gambles on the desirability approach, and horse lotteries in a choice function context. A detailed discussion of this issue can be found in a recent paper by Zaffalon and Miranda [36] , but for our present purposes it suffices to mention that choosing between gambles essentially amounts to choosing between horse lotteries with only two rewards-say, winning a prize and not winning it-and the value of a gamble is essentially proportional to the probability of winning the prize on the corresponding horse lottery approach. This correspondence makes it relatively straightforward to translate the axioms proposed by Seidenfeld et al. [27] for choice functions on horse lotteries into their counterparts for gambles: we prefer to work with gambles here because that makes it easier to see the link with sets of desirable gambles. We will find it expedient to drop two particular axioms from the theory proposed by Seidenfeld et al. [27] , thus making our coherence notion less restrictive. The first one is the Archimedean axiom, which is not fully compatible with the theory of coherent sets of desirable gambles-indeed it is letting go of Archimedean continuity that allows coherent sets of desirable gambles to avoid the problems that arise when conditioning on sets of probability zero. We have also not included the convexity axiom of Seidenfeld et al. [27] , since it is incompatible with Walley-Sen maximality [30, 34] , the optimality criterion typically associated with sets of desirable gambles. We discuss the axioms for our coherent choice functions and their main properties in Section 2.
In Section 3, we show that models of coherent sets of desirable gambles can be embedded within our theory of coherent choice functions, and we study the specific properties of choice functions that can be related to desirability. This exploratory work culminates in Section 4, where we focus on sets of probability measures and collections of maximal coherent sets of desirable gambles.
Once the connection between choice functions and desirability is in place, we move-in Section 5-to a definition and closer investigation of the property of indifference between two options. This is a crucial step towards enabling uncertainty models to represent symmetry [9] . For example, when modelling exchangeability and proving de Finetti-type representation theorems, an appropriate notion of indifference is essential. For choice functions, indifference was introduced by Seidenfeld [24] , and for sets of desirable gambles by De Cooman and Quaeghebeur [11] .
The connection between choice functions and sets of desirable gambles established in Section 3 leads us to investigate how to model choice that is compatible with a set of indifference assessments. Our approach to defining indifference focuses on the quotient space induced by the indifference relation. This allows us to exploit notions and techniques from linear algebra to deal with it mathematically. It also enables us to prove a representation result that makes it easy to consider conservative inference under indifference. We show how our notion is related to the one established by Seidenfeld [24] .
We conclude the paper with some additional discussion in Section 6. In order not to impede the main flow of the argumentation, we have moved all proofs to an appendix.
CHOICE FUNCTIONS ON OPTION SETS
Consider a real vector space V, provided with the vector addition + and scalar multiplication. We denote by 0 the additive identity, or null vector. For any subsets O 1 and O 2 of V and any λ in R, we define λ
Proposition 1. Given a choice function C, the corresponding binary relation ⊲ C is a choice relation.
Interestingly, we can use C and ⊲ interchangeably: Proposition 2. Given any choice function C, we have C ⊲ C = C. Similarly, given any choice relation ⊲, we have ⊲ C ⊲ =⊲. As a consequence, ⊲ C =⊲⇔ C ⊲ = C for all C in C and ⊲ in S.
Rationality axioms.
Seidenfeld et al. [27, Section 3] call a choice function C coherent if there is a non-empty set of probability-utility pairs S such that C(O) is the set of options in O that maximise expected utility for some element of S. They also provide an axiomatisation for this type of coherence, based on the one for binary preferences [2] . One of their axioms is an 'Archimedean' continuity condition, and another one is a convexity condition, necessary for the connection with a set of probability-utility pairs.
We prefer to define coherence directly in terms of axioms, without reference to probabilities and utilities. In such a context, we see no compelling reason to adopt an Archimedean axiom, all the more so because we are interested in establishing the connection between choice functions and Walley's [35] sets of desirable gambles, which need not satisfy this axiom. Furthermore, the convexity condition does not generally allow for choice functions that select the undominated options under some partial ordering, which is something we find natural, and will need later on.
For these reasons, we propose an alternative-and in some sense weaker-axiomatisation in Section 2.2.2 by dropping the Archimedean condition and the convexity condition of Seidenfeld et al. [27] . Then again, our second axiom is a slightly strengthened version of theirs, needed for the conditioning we intend to discuss in a later paper. With any proper convex cone K ⊆ V, we associate an ordering ⪯ K on V, defined for all u and v in V as follows:
We also write u ⪰ K v for v ⪯ K u. The ordering ⪯ K is actually a vector ordering: it is a partial order-reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive-that satisfies the following two characteristic properties:
(1)
for all u 1 ,u 2 ,v in V and λ in R >0 . Conversely, given any vector ordering ⪯, the proper convex cone K from which it is derived can always be retrieved by K = {u ∈ V ∶ u ⪰ 0}. When the abstract options are gambles, ⪯ will typically be the pointwise order. When the options are equivalence classes, as in Section 5.2, the ordering will be typically the induced ordering on equivalence classes, defined in Equation (13) further on. The vector space of options V, ordered by the vector ordering ⪯ K , is called an ordered vector space ⟨V,⪯ K ⟩. We will refrain from explicitly mentioning the actual proper convex cone K we are using, and simply write V to mean the ordered vector space, and use ⪯ for the associated vector ordering.
Finally, with any vector ordering ⪯, we associate the strict partial ordering ≺ as follows:
We call u positive if u ≻ 0, and collect all positive options in the convex cone V ≻0 ∶= K ∖ {0}. At this point, it is important to mention that from here on, we assume the cone K to be fixed and given. It serves to identify a 'positive orthant' V ≻0 = K ∖ {0}, and should not be confused with the sets of desirable options (defined further on in Section 3.1), which are cones as well, and typically include the positive orthant V ≻0 . 
Rationality axioms for choice functions.
. We collect all coherent choice functions on V in the setC.
Remark that Axiom C 3 b is well defined, in the sense that none of C's arguments there can be empty. Indeed, O 2 ∖ O is guaranteed to be non-empty: since O ⊆ O 2 ∖ O 1 , we find that O 2 ∖ O must include the set O 1 , which is non-empty by taking Axiom C 1 into account.
Parts C 3 a and C 3 b of Axiom C 3 are respectively known as Sen's condition α and Aizerman's condition. They are more commonly written as, respectively:
and
The first one means that any option that is rejected in a option set O 2 must also be rejected in any larger option set O (i.e., the inclusion of new options in the set cannot make an option that was rejected to become acceptable), while the second one means that if we reject an option in O 2 we should also reject it when we remove some options that are also rejected from the option set (i.e., the removal of rejected options does not alter the judgments about the remaining ones).
The following proposition collects a number of immediate properties of coherent choice functions.
Proposition 3. The following statements hold for any coherent choice function C:
As already announced and motivated earlier, our axioms in Definition 4 are a subset of the ones considered by Seidenfeld et al. [27] , who use horse lotteries as the basic options a subject must choose between. The set of all horse lotteries plays a similar role there as our vector space of options V does here. We omit two of Seidenfeld et al.'s [27] axioms: the Archimedean axiom, ensuring some continuity of coherent choice functions, and a convexity axiom. However, in further work we do intend to study the implications of adding the convexity axiom in the context of the relation between choice functions and sets of desirable options.
Our Axiom C 2 is a slightly strengthened version of one of Seidenfeld et al.'s [27] axioms. To compensate for this slightly weaker requirement, they impose the two properties (ii)a and (ii)b of our Proposition 3 as separate rationality axioms [27, Axiom 4] . Our proofs for them rely quite heavily on, amongst other things, our slightly stronger Axiom C 2 . Our reason for using this strengthened version is that we want to concentrate on the relationship with desirability: any choice function that does not satisfy Axiom C 2 does not induce a coherent set of desirable gambles, as we will see in Section 3. 
where ⪯ is some predetermined reflexive order on H. Seidenfeld et al.'s [27] choice functions are defined on horse lotteries while we define our choice functions on any linear space, so direct comparison is not immediate. But there is a very close formal resemblance between the two sets of axioms. Indeed, Axioms C 1 and C * 1 correspond; so do Axioms C 3 and C * 3 ; and-perhaps less obviously-Axioms C 4 and C * 4 . Axiom C * 2 , being a dominance condition, is essentially Proposition 3(ii), and can be regarded as a weaker counterpart of Axiom C 2 . In the present setting, we are not interested in Axiom C * 5 because it is in general not compatible with maximality as a decision rule; neither are we interested in Axiom C * 6 because it is a continuity requirement that is not fully compatible with sets of desirable gambles.
2.2.3.
Rationality axioms for choice relations. It turns out we can formulate the rationality axioms for choice functions-Definition 4-directly in terms of choice relations.
We collect all coherent choice relations on V in the setS.
The following proposition collects a number of immediate properties of coherent choice relations. 1 Proposition 4. The following statements hold for any coherent choice relation ⊲:
(i) ⊲ is a strict partial order: it is irreflexive and transitive;
The rationality axioms of Definitions 4 and 5 correspond:
Proposition 5. Given any coherent choice function C, ⊲ C is a coherent choice relation. Conversely, given any coherent choice relation ⊲, C ⊲ is a coherent choice function.
2.3.
The 'is not more informative than' relation. Because we are interested in conservative reasoning with choice functions, we want to look for those implications of a given assessment that are as 'uninformative' as possible. To this end, we need to introduce some binary relation ⊑ on the set C of all choice functions, having the specific interpretation of 'not more informative than', or, in other words, 'at least as uninformative as'. Definition 6. Given two choice functions C 1 and C 2 in C, we call C 1 not more informative than C 2 -and we write
This intuitive way of ordering choice functions is also used by Bradley [4] and Van Camp et al. [31] . The underlying idea is that a choice function is more informative when it consistently chooses more specifically-or more restrictively-amongst the available options. The corresponding notion for choice relations is as follows: given two choice relations ⊲ 1 and ⊲ 2 , ⊲ 1 is not more informative than
That is, choice relation ⊲ 2 is at least as informative as ⊲ 1 when every comparison made by ⊲ 1 is also made by ⊲ 2 .
Since, by definition, ⊑ is a product ordering of set inclusions, the following result is immediate [6] . Proposition 6. The structure (C;⊑) is a complete lattice:
(i) it is a partially ordered set, or poset, meaning that the binary relation ⊑ on C is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive;
(ii) for any subset C ′ of C, its infimum infC ′ and its supremum supC ′ with respect to the ordering ⊑ exist in C, and are given by infC
The idea underlying these notions of infimum and supremum is that infC ′ is the most informative model that is not more informative than any of the models in C ′ , and supC ′ the least informative model that is not less informative than any of the models in C ′ .
We will also consider the poset (C;⊑) of all coherent choice functions, whereC ⊆ C inherits the partial order ⊑ from C. Similarly, in the poset (S;⊑ S ) of all coherent choice relations,S is assumed to inherit the partial order ⊑ S from S.
Also from an order-theoretic point of view, choice functions or choice relations are equivalent:
Proposition 7. The posets (C;⊑) and (S;⊑ S ) are order isomorphic [6] : there is a map f from C to S such that C 1 ⊑ C 2 ⇔ f (C 1 ) ⊑ S f (C 2 ) for all C 1 and C 2 in C. Moreover, the posets (C;⊑) and (S;⊑ S ) are order isomorphic as well.
This proposition implies that we can regard ⊑ and ⊑ S essentially as the same partial orders, each defined on their respective domains, in the sense that each of the partial orders can be obtained from the other one just by renaming. Therefore, from now on, we will identify ⊑ S with ⊑, and only use the latter. As a result of Proposition 7, (S;⊑) is a complete infimum-semilattice as well.
This, for instance, allows us to do conservative inference with choice functions: if we consider that there is a coherent choice function that represents a subject's beliefs (coherent choices) and we can only tell that it belongs to a family {C i ∶ i ∈ I}, the conservative option is to consider its infimum inf i∈I C i . This choice function is still guaranteed to be coherent, and as a consequence, it satisfies all the rationality requirements discussed above.
As we will show in Proposition 14 further on, there is a least informative coherent choice function, namely the infimum of all coherent choice functions: it is given by
THE RELATION WITH SETS OF DESIRABLE OPTIONS
In general, a choice function cannot be characterised using only pairwise comparisons of options, meaning that a binary relation on options does not uniquely determine a choice function. In this section, we study a special class of choice functions that are determined by their restrictions to option sets of cardinality two.
3.1. Sets of desirable options. Sets of desirable options are a(n obvious and immediate) generalisation of sets of desirable gambles. Gambles are real-valued maps on a possibility space X , interpreted as uncertain rewards. They can be seen as vectors in the vector space R X . Here we generalise this notion by looking at a general (abstract) vector space V of (abstract) options, rather than gambles, provided with a vector ordering ⪯; see also Section 2.2.1. We will see that sets of desirable options amount to a pairwise comparison of options and therefore correspond to a special kind of choice functions.
A set of desirable options D is simply a subset of the vector space of options V-its interpretation will be that it contains those options that some subject strictly prefers to the status quo 0. We collect all possible such sets of desirable options in the set D. As we did for choice functions, we pay special attention to coherent sets of desirable options. The following is an immediate generalisation of existing coherence definitions [7, 10, 11, 19] from gambles to abstract options. Definition 7. A set of desirable options D is called coherent if for all u and v in V and λ in R >0 :
We letD denote the set of all coherent sets of desirable options.
Axioms D 3 and D 4 turn coherent sets of desirable options D into convex cones-meaning that posi(D) = D. They include the positive options due to Axiom D 2 , but not the zero option due to Axiom D 1 . As an immediate consequence, their intersection with V ≺0 ∶= −V ≻0 is empty. As usual, we may associate with the convex cone D a strict partial order - [11, 19] . The connection between this order and the one associated to choice functions will be clarified in Section 3.3.
3.2.
The 'is not more informative than' relation. Sets of desirable options can be ordered according to a 'not more informative than' relation, analogously to the ordering introduced for choice functions.
Definition 8. Given two sets of desirable options D 1 ,D 2 in D, we call D 1 not more informative than D 2 when D 1 ⊆ D 2 .
Because the ordering of sets of desirable options ⊆ is just set inclusion, it is a partial ordering on D, and the poset (D;⊆) is a complete lattice, with supremum operator ⋃, and infimum operator ⋂. Next we investigate the structure of the set of all coherent sets of desirable options: Proposition 9. (D;⊆) is a complete infimum-semilattice, or alternatively,D is an intersection structure-closed under arbitrary non-empty intersections. The least informative (smallest) set of desirable options D v is given by D v ∶= V ≻0 .
We will refer to D v as the vacuous set of desirable options.
It will be useful to also consider the maximally informative, or maximal, coherent sets of desirable options. 2 They are the undominated elements of the complete infimum-semilattice (D;⊆); we collect them into a setD:
First, we prove a useful proposition that will allow us to characterise these maximal elements very elegantly. 
2 The discussion in the rest of this section is based on similar discussions about sets of desirable gambles [5, 11, 20] . We repeat the details here mutatis mutandis to make the paper more self-contained.
Next we show that the set of all coherent sets of desirable options is dually atomic, meaning that any coherent set of desirable options is the infimum of its non-empty set of dominating maximal coherent sets of desirable options:
Proposition 11. For any coherent set of desirable options D, its set of dominating maximal coherent sets of desirable optionsD D ∶= {D ∈D ∶ D ⊆D} is non-empty. Moreover, D = infD D .
3.3. Connection between choice functions and sets of desirable options. We now set out to establish a connection between choice functions and sets of desirable options.
Definition 9. Given a choice function C, we say that an option v is chosen over some option u whenever u ∉ C({u,v}), or equivalently, whenever {u} ⊲ C {v}. Similarly, given a set of desirable options D, we say that an option v is preferred to some option u whenever v − u ∈ D, or equivalently, u v. We call a choice function C and a set of desirable options D compatible when
Compatibility means that the behaviour of the choice function restricted to pairs of options reflects the behaviour of the set of desirable options. 3 3.3.1. From choice functions to desirability. We begin by studying the properties of the set of desirable options compatible with a given coherent choice function. Since compatibility is related to the restriction of the choice function to pairwise comparison, it is not surprising that each choice function has a unique compatible set of desirable options: Proposition 12. For any coherent choice function C inC, the unique compatible coherent set of desirable options D C is given by
Example 1. Consider V = R 2 , and let us denote the two components of any vector u in R 2 by u 1 and u 1 , so u = (u 1 ,u 2 ). Let C be the choice function given by
It is easy to check that C is a coherent choice function-it is an example of what we will call an E-admissible choice function later. And
is its associated coherent set of desirable options.
3 See Seidenfeld et al. [25] for an axiomatisation of imprecise preferences in the context of binary comparisons of horse lotteries, rather than gambles.
3.3.2.
From desirability to choice functions. We collect inC D all the coherent choice functions that are compatible with a given coherent set of desirable options D:
The correspondence between choice functions and sets of desirable options can be manyto-one, in the sense that several different coherent choice functions may be compatible with the same coherent set of desirable options. An important role is played by the most uninformative of them:
Proposition 13. Given a coherent set of desirable options D, the infimum-most uninformative element-infC D of its set of compatible coherent choice functionsC D is the coherent choice function C D , defined by
The coherent choice function C D is the least informative choice function that is compatible with a coherent set of desirable options D: it is based on the binary ordering represented by D and nothing else. As we will see in Proposition 19, there typically are other coherent choice functions C compatible with D, but they encode more information than just the binary ordering represented by D. Proposition 13 is especially interesting because it shows that the most conservative choice function based on a strict partial order of options, is the choice function based on maximality 4 -the one that selects the undominated options under the strict partial order associated with a coherent set of desirable options D. Any choice function that is based on maximality under such a strict partial order is coherent. Proposition 13 can also be interpreted in terms of choice relations: given a coherent set of desirable gambles D-or a coherent preference relation -, the most uninformative choice relation ⊲ D that is compatible with it, is by Proposition 7 equal to ⊲ C D , and determined by
This shows that the partial order ⊲ D is simply the result of lifting from elements to sets.
Example 2. Let D be the coherent set of desirable options given by Equation (7). Its associated coherent choice function C D is given by
so it coincides with the choice function given by Equation (6).
Although in this particular example the two procedures coincide, there is in general more than one coherent choice function that is compatible with a coherent set of desirable options. In other words, a coherent choice function is not uniquely determined by its restriction to binary comparisons; we will give an example in Example 6 further on. Proposition 8 guarantees that there is a unique smallest-least informative-coherent choice function. We will call it the vacuous choice function, and denote it by C v .
It selects from any set of options the ones that are undominated under the strict vector ordering ≺.
Similarly, the vacuous choice relation ⊲ v is equal to ⊲ C v by Proposition 7, and is deter-
Example 3. Consider, as a simple example, the case that the vector ordering is total, meaning that for any u,v in V, either u ≺ v, v ≺ u or u = v. It then follows from Proposition 14 that, for any coherent choice function C,
where maxO is the unique largest element of the finite option set O according to the strict total ordering ≺. But then Axiom C 1 guarantees that
Properties of the relation between choice functions and desirability. Since sets of desirable options represent only pairwise comparison, and are therefore generally less expressive than choice functions, we expect that going from a choice function to a compatible set of desirable options leads to a loss of information, whereas going the opposite route does not. This is confirmed by Propositions 15 and 16, and in particular by their Corollary 17.
Proposition 15. Consider any set of coherent choice functions
Definition 10. For any set of coherent sets of desirable options D ′ ⊆D, we define the 'infimum of maximality' choice function as
This result also helps to highlight that coherent choice functions are indeed more informative than coherent sets of desirable options, in the sense that two different coherent choice functions (C inf D ′ and C D ′ ) may determine the same coherent set of desirable options (infD ′ ) when restricted to option sets of cardinality two. Thus, we need to move to this richer model in order to fully represent the beliefs encompassed by {C D ∶ D ∈ D ′ }. Moreover, this happens even if each of the choice functions in the set D ′ is fully determined by a coherent set of desirable options.
From these two results we immediately deduce the following:
Consider any coherent set of desirable options D ∈D and any coherent choice function C ∈C. Then D = D C D and C D C ⊑ C.
If we consider the maps
then Corollary 17 essentially states that
This observation helps us interpret Propositions 15 and 16 using the commuting diagrams for Proposition 15:
and for Proposition 16:
Full lines indicate the maps (D • , C • or inf), while dashed lines indicate an "is not more informative than" (⊑ for choice functions, ⊆ for sets of desirable gambles) relation. Example 5 in Section 4 further on will show that the inequalities in these results can be strict; this does not seem surprising for the inequality of Proposition 15, but is perhaps less intuitively obvious for the one in Proposition 16.
OTHER TYPES OF COHERENT CHOICE FUNCTIONS
Given a coherent set of desirable options, we can define a coherent choice function by selecting undominated elements as in Equation (8). However, these are not the only possible coherent choice functions: for instance, any infimum of such coherent choice functions is still coherent. Proposition 18. Consider any set of coherent sets of desirable options D ′ ⊆D, then C D ′ is a coherent choice function.
This proposition gives a procedure to define coherent choice functions complying with a sensitivity analysis interpretation, where the underlying uncertainty model is that of coherent sets of desirable options: we may consider a set D ′ of possible models and then the set of coherent choice functions they determine; by taking the infimum of this set we end up choosing those options that are considered acceptable by at least one of the possible models. 
Then the choice function C = inf{C D 1 ,C D 2 } is coherent. If we consider for instance the option set O = {(4,−4),(2,−1),(0,0),(−1,2)}, we obtain
The first two options are elements of C D 1 (O) and the last one is an element of C D 2 (O).
As special cases, we may consider 'infimum of maximality' choice functions where some additional condition is imposed on the coherent sets of desirable options. We will investigate two such situations in this section, although other are possible. In Definition 11, we focus only on sets of maximal coherent sets of desirable options, that we introduced in Section 3.2. Their interest lies in the fact that they are related to mass functions, as we discussed quite thoroughly in [5, 11, 20] in the context of gambles.
Definition 11. If D ′ ⊆D is a set of maximal coherent set of desirable options, the coherent choice function C D ′ is called M-admissible. We will also denote it by C M D ′ as a reminder that the infimum is taken over maximal sets.
In particular, we can consider the M-admissible choice functions for the set D ′ =D D of all maximal coherent set of desirable options that include a coherent set of desirable options D.
In order not to overburden the notation, we let
and similarly to what we did before, we introduce the map (9). The following result can be regarded as a particular case of Proposition 16, where all the coherent sets of desirable options are maximal ones. As we have seen there too, the diagram below commutes if we focus on sets of desirable options, but this is not longer the case if we consider the more informative model of coherent choice functions.
The inequality in Proposition 19 can be strict-meaning that C D ′ ⊏ C M D ′ for some coherent set of desirable options D ′ -as we will show in Example 6 below.
As another special case, we consider choice functions associated with Levi's notion of Eadmissibility [17, Chapter 5] . They are based on a non-empty set of mass functions. Consider a finite possibility space X , and maps from X to R (the options are gambles now), forming the vector space V = R X of finite dimension X . The vector ordering ⪯ we associate with this vector space of options is the pointwise ordering of real maps:
is the x-component of the option u. We call any map p∶X → R with (∀x ∈ X )p(x) ≥ 0 and ∑ x∈X p(x) = 1 a (probability) mass function, and we associate an expectation E p with p by letting E p (u) ∶= ∑ x∈X p(x)u x for all u in V. We collect in Σ X all the mass functions on X .
With a mass function p, we associate a set of desirable options
and a choice function C p defined for all O in Q by
Proposition 20. The set of desirable options D p and the choice function C p are coherent and compatible, and moreover C p = C D p .
This result allows us to introduce the following, second special case of 'infimum of maximality' choice functions.
Definition 12. With any non-empty set of mass functions K, 5 we associate the correspond-
5 Although Levi's notion of E-admissibility was originally concerned with convex closed sets of mass functions [17, Chapter 5] , we impose no such requirement here on the set K.
Proposition 21. Given any non-empty set of mass functions K, we have for all O in Q that
The following proposition establishes a connection between M-admissible and E-admissible choice functions.
Proposition 22. For any non-empty set of mass functions K,
The key for this result is that, for any mass function p, there is in general more than one coherent set of desirable options D that is associated with it by means of the formula
This is why in general coherent sets of desirable options are more informative than (sets of) mass functions as a belief model. Among all the coherent sets of desirable options satisfying Equation (12) with respect to a fixed p, the least informative one is the one given by Equation (10), which is usually referred to as the set of strictly desirable gambles associated with p within the imprecise probability literature. This in turn gives rise to a coherent choice function that will be less informative than one determined by a maximal set of options that is compatible with p by means of Equation (12). Thus, the choice between E-admissible and M-admissible coherent choice functions can be made by considering our attitude towards imprecision, that determines the use of strictly desirable or maximal sets of options: the former are as conservative as possible, and make a choice only when it is implied by the probability mass function p; while the latter are as informative as it can be considering the axioms of coherence and the probability mass function p.
The following examples show why choice functions are more powerful than sets of desirable options as uncertainty representations, and elucidate the difference between Eadmissible and M-admissible choice functions.
Example 5. Consider the situation where you have a coin with two identical sides of unknown type: 6 either both sides are heads (H), or both sides are tails (T). The random variable that represents the outcome of a coin flip assumes a value in the finite possibility space X ∶= {H,T}. The options we consider are gambles: real-valued functions on X , which constitute the two-dimensional vector space R X , ordered by the pointwise order. We model this situation using (a) coherent sets of desirable options, (b) M-admissible choice functions, and (c) E-admissible choice functions. In all three cases we start from two simple models: one that describes practical certainty of H and another that describes practical certainty of T, and we take their infimum-the most informative model that is still at most as informative as either-as a candidate model for the coin problem.
For (a), we use two coherent sets of desirable options D H and D T , expressing practical certainty of H and T, respectively, given by the maximal sets of desirable options
where u H and u T denote the values of the gamble u in H and T, respectively. The model for the coin with two identical sides is then D H ∩ D T = V ≻0 . This vacuous model D v is incapable of distinguishing between this situation and the one where we are completely ignorant about the coin. 6 The example can be trivially reformulated to consider a random variable taking values in a binary possibility space, with only one of those elements occurring; however we think the use of a coin adds some intuition and helps in particular when we introduce indifference in Section 5 later on.
For an approach (b) that distinguishes between these two situations, we draw inspiration from Proposition 15: instead of working with the sets of desirable options themselves, we move to the corresponding choice functions
for instance in the case of C H , note that amongst all the options attaining the maximum value on heads, exactly one of them is undominated. The M-admissible choice function we are looking for is
which selects at most two options from each option set. It is given by
For (c), the set of mass functions K consists of the two degenerate mass functions:
So we see that C p H = C H and C p T = C T , and therefore this approach leads to the same choice function as the previous one:
The example above shows that the correspondence between desirability and choice functions is not a complete inf-homomorphism, as illustrated also at the end of Section 3. Example 6. In this example, we illustrate the difference between E-admissible and Madmissible choice functions. We consider the same finite possibility space X ∶= {H,T} as in Example 5, with the same option space and vector ordering. For both E-admissibility and M-admissibility, we each time consider the least informative choice functions: the E-admissible choice function C E Σ X associated with set of all mass functions K = Σ X , and the M-admissible choice function C M D v associated with the set of all maximal sets of desirable optionsD D v =D. Since C E Σ X and C M D v are the most conservative E-admissible, respectively M-admissible choice functions, we wonder about their relation, as well as their relation with the vacuous choice function C v . We find that
Since for everyD inD, there is some mass function p in Σ X such that D p ⊆D [it suffices to consider the mass function p corresponding withD], we find that
. By the definition of the vacuous choice function, we have as an intermediate result that 
. Then for the specific mass function p ∶= ( 1 2, 1 2) ∈ Σ X , we find that 
As remarked by a reviewer, we can interpret the example above in terms of the choice relation associated with a choice function, in the following manner: in the case of a complete preference relation we always have that {0} ⊲ C {u,−u} for every option u. This is not the case for those induced by sets of strictly desirable options, such as the coherent choice function C p in the example, which therefore cannot be obtained as infima of a family of complete choice relations (as are those given by M-admissibility).
In Section 5.7, we will present another example that illustrates the difference between E-admissible and M-admissible choice functions.
There are other coherent sets of desirable options that can be associated with a mass function p and that are intermediate between the strictly desirable and the maximal ones. One example are the so-called lexicographic sets of desirable options, which we have investigated in detail elsewhere [32] . Taking into account Proposition 18, we can also define coherent choice functions by taking the infimum of a family of coherent choice functions determined by such lexicographic sets. Indeed, this provides another example of coherent choice function that admits an axiomatic characterisation in some cases, as reported in [32] .
To conclude this section, we want to mention that there are other popular choice rules besides maximality and E-admissibility, such as, amongst others, Γ-maximin, Γ-maximax and interval dominance [30] . However, they are not coherent: none of them is guaranteed to satisfy, amongst others, Axiom C 4 b.
INDIFFERENCE
5.1. Indifference and desirability. For sets of desirable gambles, there is a systematic way of modelling indifference [8, 11, 20] . In what follows, we recall how to do this, but formulate everything in terms of the more abstract notion of options, rather than gambles.
In addition to a subject's set of desirable options D-the options he strictly prefers to the zero option-we can also consider the options that he considers to be equivalent to the zero option. We call these options indifferent. A set of indifferent options I is simply a subset of V, but as before with desirable options, we pay special attention to coherent sets of indifferent options.
Definition 13. A set of indifferent options I is called coherent if for all u,v in V and λ in R:
Taken together, Axioms I 3 and I 4 are equivalent to imposing that span(I) = I, and due to Axiom I 1 , I is non-empty and therefore a linear subspace of V.
The interaction between indifferent and desirable options is subject to rationality criteria as well: they should be compatible with one another. The smallest such compatible coherent set of indifferent options is always the trivial one, given by the null space I = {0}. The idea behind Definition 14 is that adding an indifferent option to a desirable option does not make it non-desirable, or also, that adding a desirable option to an indifferent one makes it desirable.
Since D ⊆ D + I due to Axiom I 1 , compatibility of D and I is equivalent to D + I = D. An immediate consequence of compatibility between a coherent set of desirable options D and a coherent set of indifferent options I is that D ∩ I = ∅, meaning that no option can be assessed as desirable-strictly preferred to the zero option-and indifferent-equivalent to the zero option-at the same time. To see this, if ex absurdo D ∩ I ≠ ∅, then there is some u in D such that u ∈ I. But then, by Axiom I 3 , also −u ∈ I, so compatibility of D with I implies that u + (−u) = 0 ∈ D, a contradiction with Axiom D 1 .
5.2.
Indifference and quotient spaces. In order to introduce indifference for choice functions, we build on a coherent set of indifferent options I, as defined in Definition 13. Two options u and v are considered to be indifferent, to a subject, whenever v − u is indifferent to the zero option, or in other words whenever v − u ∈ I. The underlying idea will be that we identify indifferent options, and choose between equivalence classes of indifferent options, rather than between single options. We formalise this intuition below.
We collect all options that are indifferent to an option u ∈ V into the equivalence class This quotient space is a vector space under the vector addition, given by That we identify indifferent options, and therefore express preferences between equivalence classes of indifferent options, essentially means that we define choice functions on Q(V I). But in order to characterise coherence for such choice functions, we need to introduce a convenient vector ordering on V I that is appropriately related to the vector ordering on V; see Section 2.2. For two elements [u] and [v] of V I, we define
and as usual, the strict variant of the vector ordering on V I is characterised by
We begin by showing that this is indeed a vector ordering: 
5.3. Quotient spaces and sets of desirable options. We use this quotient space to prove interesting characterisations of indifference for sets of desirable options. This, together with the definition of compatibility, shows that the correspondence between sets of desirable options on V and (their representing) sets of desirable options on V I is one-to-one and onto. It also preserves coherence. 5.4. Quotient spaces and choice functions. The discussion above inspires us to combine indifference with choice functions in the following manner: given a coherent set of indifferent options I, we say that a choice function is compatible with it when it is determined by its restriction to the quotient space that I induces. This, together with the definition of compatibility, shows that the correspondence between choice functions on Q(V) and (their representing) choice functions on Q(V I) is one-to-one and onto. It also preserves coherence: Proposition 28. Consider any choice function C on Q(V) that is compatible with a coherent set of indifferent options I, and its representing choice function C I on Q(V I). Then C is coherent if and only if C I is.
To conclude this general discussion of indifference for choice functions, we mention that it is closed under arbitrary infima, which enables conservative inference under indifference: we can consider the least informative choice function that is compatible with some assessments and is still compatible with a given coherent set of indifferent options. In particular, the least informative coherent choice function C that is compatible with a coherent set of indifferent options I corresponds to the case where the associated choice function C I on the quotient space Q(V I) is the vacuous one C v , meaning that
5.5.
The relation with other definitions of indifference. Seidenfeld [24] has a rather different approach to combining a notion of indifference with choice functions. After making the necessary translation from horse lotteries to gambles, it can be summarised as follows. Rather than, as we have done above, starting out with a notion of indifference and then looking at which choice functions are compatible with it, he starts from a given choice function C, and associates a binary relation ≈ C on V with it as follows:
The idea behind this definition is that two options are considered to be related if both options are either chosen or rejected, whenever both are available. This relation has the following interesting properties, which are instrumental in elucidating the relationship between Seidenfeld's approach and ours:
Proposition 30. Let C be a coherent choice function. Then ≈ C is an equivalence relation that furthermore satisfies
for all u,v,w ∈ V and all λ ∈ R. As a consequence, the set I C ∶= {u ∈ V ∶ u ≈ C 0} is a coherent set of indifferent options.
Indeed, the coherent set of indifferent options I C turns out to be the largest that C is compatible with: It follows that if C is compatible with I, then C is automatically also compatible with any subspace of I, and that the largest linear subspace that C is compatible with, is I C . Also, this proposition shows that the smallest set of indifferent option that is compatible with C, is given by I = {0}, and that set of indifferent options is compatible with any coherent choice function. Seidenfeld's approach starts from a choice function, and identifies the coarsest equivalence-or indifference-relation that is compatible with it. Though we have seen that it is related, our approach, because it starts out with an indifference relation, goes the other way around, is more constructive, and is better suited for studying which choice functions are compatible with a given indifference relation, and therefore also for performing conservative inference for choice functions under indifference. We will come back to this idea in Sections 5.7 and 5.8.
Proposition 31 also shows that our approach is closely connected to Bradley's [4, Section 2], which he has linked to the notion of sequential coherence: for him, for a choice function to 'satisfy'-in our words: to 'be compatible with'-an equivalence relation, it must be finer than Seidenfeld's ≈ C .
Finally, note that a relation analogous to Equation (15) can be established for coherent sets of desirable options D: 
5.7.
Example: fair coins. To exhibit the power and simplicity of our definition of indifference, we reconsider the finite possibility space X ∶= {H,T} of Example 5, where the vector space V is again the two-dimensional vector space R X of real-valued functions on X , or gambles, and the vector ordering ⪯ is the usual pointwise ordering of gambles. We want to express indifference between heads and tails, or in other words between I H and I T , where I H ∶= (1,0) and I T ∶= (0,1). This means that I H − I T is considered equivalent to the zero gamble, so the linear space of all gambles that are equivalent to zero-or in other words, the set of indifferent gambles (or options)-is then given by
where E p is the expectation associated with the uniform mass function p = ( 1 2, 1 2) on {H,T}, associated with a fair coin:
So, for any option u in R X -any real-valued function on X :
which tells us that the equivalence class [u] can be characterised by the common uniform expectation E p (u) of its elements. Therefore, R X I has unit dimension, and we can identify it with the real line R. The vector ordering between equivalence classes is given by, using Equation (13):
Hence, the strict vector ordering ≺ on R X I is total, so we infer from the argumentation in Example 3 that there is only one representing choice function, namely the vacuous one. Therefore, there is only one choice function C on Q(R X ) that is compatible with I, namely, the one that has the vacuous choice function C v on Q(R X I) as its representation C I. Recall that for any O in Q(R X ):
and therefore
The indifference assessment between heads and tails leaves us no choice but to use an E-admissible model for a probability mass function, associated with a fair coin.
The choice function C is therefore based on E-admissibility, but is not compatible with M-admissibility. To see this, consider the set of options O ∶= {w,0,−w} with w ∶= (1,−1), so w H + w T = 0. Hence C(O) = O; but no M-admissible choice function will select 0 in O: observe that 0 ∉ CD(O) for allD ∈ D ′ , because 0 ∈ CD(O) would imply that {w,−w}∩D = ∅, contradicting thatD is a maximal set of desirable options by Proposition 10.
5.8.
Choice functions and symmetry. As another example showing how powerful our approach to dealing with choice and indifference is, we will prove a simple and elegant representation result that tells us how to perform conservative inference with choice functions under a permutation symmetry assessment.
We consider a finite possibility space X , where the vector space V of options is the finitedimensional vector space R rX , of R r -valued functions on X , or vector-valued gambles on the outcome of an uncertain variable X in X . The vector ordering ⪯ is the usual pointwise ordering of such vector-valued gambles. 7 We assume there is symmetry lurking behind the uncertain variable X, represented by a group P of permutations of the set of possible outcomes X -the idea being that a subject assesses that no distinction should be made between an outcome x and its permutations πx, for π ∈ P-or in other words, between the variable X and its permutations πX. If we consider any vector-valued gamble u(X) on the variable X, then the subject will therefore be indifferent between the uncertain vector-valued rewards u(X) and u(πX). The smallest coherent 8 set of indifferent options I P that corresponds to this indifference assessment, is therefore given by I P ∶= span({u − π t u ∶ u ∈ V and π ∈ P}), 7 The reason why we work with vector-valued gambles here rather than real-valued ones, is because Zaffalon and Miranda [36] have shown that this leads to an approach to modelling uncertainty that is even more general than the typical imprecise probability approach. 8 The requirement that I P ∩ V ≺0 = ∅-or equivalently I P ∩ V ≻0 = ∅-is related to the left amenability of the finite permutation group P [9, 34] , and is easily shown to be satisfied.
where we defined the linear permutation operator π t on the linear space of options (vectorvalued gambles) V by π t u = u ○ π, or in other words (π t u)(x) ∶= u(πx) for all u in V, x in X and π in P.
Let us, for any x in X , define the permutation invariant atom [x] P containing x as
These atoms constitute a partition of X , and we denote the set of all of them by A P ∶= {[x] P ∶ x ∈ X }. A vector-valued gamble u is called P-invariant if π t u = u for all π in P, and it is not hard to see that this is equivalent to u being constant on the invariant atoms. The set of all P-invariant vector-valued gambles is denoted by V P , and it is a linear subspace of V that is clearly isomorphic to the linear space of all vector-valued functions on A P , whose dimension r A P is typically much lower than that of V.
A choice function that takes the symmetry assessment into account is-as we have argued-one that is compatible with I P and all of its subspaces. What we will do now, is to investigate how such compatible choice functions can be represented by choice functions on a typically much lower-dimensional option space: symmetry reduces complexity. Most of the work for this has already been done in Definition 15 and Proposition 27, which indeed states that choice functions compatible with I P can be represented uniquely by choice functions on the lower-dimensional quotient space V I P . The only thing we need to do, is take a closer look at this quotient space and its elements.
Let us, therefore, define the transformation inv P on V as follows:
It satisfies the following very interesting properties:
Proposition 34. inv P is a linear transformation of V, and (i) inv P ○π t = inv P = π t ○ inv P for all π in P; (ii) inv P ○inv P = inv P ; (iii) kern(inv P ) = I P ;
(iv) rng(inv P ) = V P . Moreover, for any u,v in V, we have that v ∈ u I P ⇔ inv P v = inv P u,
The various statements in this proposition tell us that inv P is a linear projection operator that maps any vector-valued gamble u to the corresponding uniquely P-invariant member inv P u of the equivalence class u I P , which is essentially a vector-valued gamble on A P . By Proposition 27, every coherent choice function C on V that is compatible with I P therefore has a unique representing coherent choice function C P on the typically much lower-dimensional linear space of all vector-valued gambles on A P , with
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have shown how the theory of choice functions may be used, with a choice of axioms to model decision problems where the choices are not uniquely determined by the pairwise comparisons, and where models of sets of desirable gambles therefore come up short.
We have made our formalisation in terms of sets of options, because this more general structure has allowed us to make a connection with modelling indifference. Nevertheless, our models remain applicable in particular to choices on sets of gambles, and thus encompass much of the behavioural theory of imprecise probabilities as a particular case. A deeper study of the definition in terms of horse lotteries, which is the model considered by Seidenfeld [24] , is one of our future lines of research. We have established that choice functions can be equivalent formulated as choice relations, that is, binary relations in terms of sets of options. This formulation adds intuition to some of the results in the paper.
We have seen that three important types of decision models can be subsumed into our theory of choice functions: one, as we have said, is that of sets of desirable options, which give rise to the choice functions defined via maximality; the others are those based on a family of sets of probability measures or, closely related, a family of maximal sets of desirable gambles. We have named these two types of models E-admissible and Madmissible choice functions, and we have shown that there are subtle differences between them. Related to this, one future line of research would be the study of maximal coherent choice functions, which are those that are not above any other choice function. As suggested by one reviewer, it may be useful here to use the equivalent formulation in terms of choice relations and to use the notion of consequence operator [6] .
One of the advantages of sets of desirable options over sets of probability measures is that they are more suited to conditioning when sets of (lower) probability zero are involved, as discussed for instance by Quaeghebeur [19] . We intend to investigate in detail in future work how conditioning for choice functions should be defined.
Finally, we have given an axiomatisation of sets of indifferent options and their compatibility with choice functions, and have shown how our definition is related to other approaches proposed in the literature. The investigation of this interesting connection under our framework is another open avenue for future research.
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APPENDIX A. PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1. We have to check that ⊲ C satisfies the two conditions of Definition 2.
which sets off the following cascade of equivalences:
where the penultimate equivalence follows from the equalities: 
Proof of Proposition 2. For the first statement, consider any choice function C, and any O in Q, and infer that
For the second statement, consider any choice relation ⊲, and any O 1 and O 2 in Q, and infer that
For the third statement, assume first that ⊲ C =⊲. Then the corresponding choice functions are equal: C ⊲ C = C ⊲ . But we have just shown that C ⊲ C = C, whence indeed C = C ⊲ . Conversely, assume that C ⊲ = C. Then the corresponding choice relations are equal: ⊲ C ⊲ =⊲ C . But we have just shown that ⊲ C ⊲ =⊲, whence indeed ⊲=⊲ C . 
Conversely, consider any u ∈ C(O) and assume ex absurdo that u ∉ C(O ′ ), then we infer from version (3) Proof of Proposition 5. We first prove the first statement. We show that ⊲ C satisfies the Axioms S 1 -S 4 .
For Axiom S 1 , consider any O in Q. Since C(O) ≠ ∅ by Axiom C 1 , we infer that
For Axiom S 2 , assume that u ≺ v. 
For Axioms S 4 a and S 4 b, assume that O 1 ⊲ C O 2 . We need to show that then λ
For the second statement, we need to show that C ⊲ satisfies the Axioms C 1 -C 4 .
For Axiom C 2 , assume that u ≺ v. For version (3) of Axiom C 3 a, assume that
For version (4) of Axiom C 3 
For Axioms C 4 a and C 4 b, assume that O 1 ⊆ C ⊲ (O 2 ). We need to show that then λ
Proof of Proposition 7. The map f we are looking for is f ∶C → S∶C ↦ f (C) ∶=⊲ C . Due to Proposition 2, f is an invertible function with inverse f −1 ∶S → C∶⊲↦ f −1 (⊲) ∶= C ⊲ , and hence f is a bijection between C and S.
For the first statement, we prove that (C;⊑) and (S;⊑ S ) are order isomorphic. We first show that C 1 ⊑ C 2 ⇒ f (C 1 ) ⊑ S f (C 2 ). So consider any two choice functions C 1 and C 2 such that
To show that f (C 1 ) ⊑ S f (C 2 ) ⇒ C 1 ⊑ C 2 , it suffices to consider any two choice relation ⊲ 1 and ⊲ 2 such that ⊲ 1 ⊑ S ⊲ 2 , and prove that C ⊲ 1 ⊑ C ⊲ 2 , because the map f is a bijection. So assume that
For the second statement, Proposition 5 guarantees that the same map is a bijection betweenC andS. Since we have already shown that both f and its inverse f −1 preserve the order, this completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 8. We show that infC ′ satisfies the rationality axioms of Definition 4:
This implies that for all C in Proof of Proposition 9. Consider any set of coherent sets of desirable options D ′ ⊆D, and its infimum infD ′ = ⋂D ′ , which is of course also a set of desirable options. We show that infD ′ is coherent, meaning that it satisfies the rationality axioms of Definition 7: Proof of Proposition 11. We have to prove that the set {D ∈D ∶ D ⊆D} has a maximal element. This will follow directly from Zorn's Lemma if we can show that any chain K in this poset has a greatest element. It is a matter of straightforward verification of the axioms to see that ⋃K is a coherent set of desirable options, so ⋃K is this greatest element.
Let us now establish the dual atomicity. By definition, D ⊆ ⋂DD, so we concentrate on proving that ⋂DD ⊆ D. Consider any u in ⋂DD , meaning that u ∈D for allD ∈D D . Assume Proof of Proposition 13. The proof is structured as follows: we show (a) that C D is compatible with D; (b) that C D is coherent; and (c) that C D ⊑ C for all C ∈C D . (a) First, we show that C D is compatible with D: Consider any u,v in V then it follows from the definition of
where the last equivalence follows from 0 ∉ D, because D is coherent [Axiom D 1 ]. (b) Next, we show that C D is coherent:
Since O is finite and is a strict partial order, we know that there is at least one maximal element u m for , meaning that
Axiom D 2 . So u ∉ C D ({u,v}) by compatibility. Since we already know that C D ({u,v}) ≠ ∅, we must therefore have that indeed {v} = C D ({u,v}). 
When we proceed in this way, we are guaranteed to find, after k ≤ n + 1 steps, some u k in Proof of Proposition 14. Because D v ∈D, we have that C D v is a coherent choice function by Proposition 13, and it then follows that Proof of Proposition 15. Recall in advance that infC ′ is a coherent choice function by Proposition 8, and that inf{D C ∶ C ∈ C ′ } is a coherent set of desirable options by Proposition 9. For the first statement, consider any u in V, and observe that
where the first and fourth equivalences follow from Proposition 12.
For the second statement, fix any O in Q and u in V such that u ∈ infC ′ (O). Then u ∈ C(O) for some C in C ′ , from which we infer that (∃C ∈ C ′ )(∀v ∈ O)u ∈ C({u,v}), by an immediate application of version (3) [use the contraposition withÕ 1 ∶= {u},Õ 2 ∶= {u,v} andÕ ∶= O] of Axiom C 3 a. By exchanging the quantifiers, we infer as an implication that
by Proposition 13. The rest of the proof is now immediate.
Proof of Proposition 16. Recall in advance that inf{C D ∶ D ∈ D ′ } is a coherent choice function by Propositions 8 and 13, and that infD ′ is a coherent set of desirable options by Proposition 9.
For the first statement, consider any u in V and observe that:
For the second statement, let C ′ ∶= {C D ∶ D ∈ D ′ }, then we infer from the first statement that proving the first statement. It then follows from Proposition 12 that D ′ is compatible with C M D ′ , and therefore from Proposition 13 that
Proof of Proposition 20. By Proposition 13, it suffices to prove (a) that D p is coherent; and (b) that C p = C D p . For (a), that Axiom D 1 holds, follows from 0 ∉ V ≻0 and E p (0) = 0. Axiom D 2 holds by definition. For Axiom D 3 , consider any u in D p and real λ in R >0 , then 0 ≺ u and therefore 0 ≺ λ u, or E p (u) > 0 and therefore E p (λ u) = λ E p (u) > 0, whence indeed λ u ∈ D p . For Axiom D 4 , consider any u,v in D p , then there are three possibilities. The first is that both u and v belong to V ≻0 , and therefore also u + v ∈ V ≻0 . The second is that both Proof of Proposition 21. We infer from Definition 12 and Proposition 20 that
where the last equality follows from Proposition 13. Now
where the first equivalence follows from Equation (10), and the second from Proposition 14.
Hence indeed
Proof of Proposition 22. We consider any p in K and prove that C D p ⊑ C M Proof of Proposition 23. To see that ⪯ is reflexive, use w = 0 in Equation (13) 
. The converse implication follows analogously, by adding −v rather than v. For (2), consider any λ in R >0 , then also
The converse implication follows analogously, by multiplying with 1 λ rather than λ . We turn to the second statement. For necessity, consider
Taken together with u ⪯ v + w for some w, this implies that indeed u ≺ v + w for some w. 
This shows that the representing choice relation is derived from the representing choice function.
For the second statement, assume that ⊲ is compatible with I, that is, there is some Proof of Proposition 28. For the direct implication, assume that C is coherent. We show that C I satisfies Axioms C 1 -C 4 b.
For Axiom C 1 , assume ex absurdo that C I(Õ) = ∅ for someÕ in Q(V I). (14) and Lemma 37, this implies that
The reasoning is similar for both equalities, and therefore we restrict ourselves here to proving the first one; the second one can be proved by replacing For the converse implication, assume that C I is coherent. We show that C satisfies Axioms Proof of Proposition 29. Let us denote C ∶= inf{C i ∶ i ∈ I}, then C is a coherent choice function by Proposition 8. We show that it is compatible with I. By assumption, and using Proposition 27, we have for all i ∈ I that Proof of Proposition 30. We first prove that ≈ C is an equivalence relation. The reflexivity and symmetry are an immediate consequence of the definition (15) . To prove transitivity, consider any u,v,w in V and assume that u ≈ C v and v ≈ C w. Consider any O in Q and assume that {u,w} ⊆ O and u ∈ C(O). Then it suffices to prove that also w ∈ C(O). Assume ex absurdo that w ∉ C(O), then we infer from Axiom C 3 a that also w ∉ C(O ∪ {v}).
Since v ≈ C w, we infer from Equation (15) To prove (i), assume that u ≈ C v. We first prove that then also −u ≈ C −v. Indeed, by applying (ii) with w ∶= −u − v, we find that −v ≈ C −u. Now use the symmetry of ≈ C . Next, consider any O ∈ Q such that {λ u,λ v} ⊆ O and λ u ∈ C(O). Then it suffices to prove that also λ v ∈ C(O). The proof is trivial if λ = 0. Because we have just proved that both u ≈ C v and −u ≈ C −v, we may now assume without loss of generality that λ > 0. It follows from λ u ∈ C(O) and Axiom C 4 a that u ∈ C( 1 λ O). Since u ≈ C v, we infer from Equation (15) that then also v ∈ C( 1 λ O), whence, again by Axiom C 4 a, indeed λ v ∈ C(O). We complete the proof by showing that I C is a coherent set of indifferent options. To prove I 1 , simply observe that 0 ≈ C 0 by reflexivity of ≈ C . To prove I 2 , it suffices to consider any u ∈ V ≻0 , due to (i). It follows from Axiom C 2 that both 0 ∉ C({0,u}) and u ∈ C({0,u}), so we infer from Equation (15) Proof of Proposition 33. We begin with the first statement. Consider any coherent choice function C that is compatible with I. We must prove that D C + I ⊆ D C . Observe that for any w in V: 
where the first equivalence follows from Proposition 12 and the second from the compatibility of C with I. So, consider any v in D C and any u in I, then Proof of Proposition 34. That the transformation inv P is linear, is immediate from its definition in Equation (16) .
To prove (i), observe that inv P ○π t = 1 P ∑ ϖ∈P ϖ t ○ π t = 1 P ∑ ϖ∈P (π ○ ϖ) t = inv P , where the last equality holds because P is a group. For the second identity, observe that π t ○ inv P = 1 P ∑ ϖ∈P π t ○ϖ t = 1 P ∑ ϖ∈P (ϖ ○π) t = inv P , where the first equality follows form the linear character of π t and the last equality holds because P is a group. To prove (ii), observe that
where the first equality is due to the linearity of inv P and the second due to (i).
To prove (iii), consider any u in kern(inv P ). Then inv P u = 0 and therefore u = u − inv P u = 1 P ∑ π∈P (u − π t u) is an element of I P . Conversely, consider any u in I P , then u = ∑ n k=1 λ k (v k − π t k v k ) for some n in N, λ k in R, v k in V and π k in P. But then inv P u = ∑ n k=1 λ k (inv P v k − inv P (π t k v k )) = 0, where the first equality is due to the linearity of inv P and the last due to (i). Hence indeed u ∈ kern(inv P ).
To prove (iv), consider any u in rng(inv P ). Then u = inv P v for some v in V, and therefore π t u = π t (inv P v) = (π t ○ inv P )v = inv P v = u for all π in P, where the third equality follows from (i). Hence indeed u ∈ V P . Conversely, consider any u in V P . Then π t u = u for all π in P, and therefore u = inv P u, whence indeed u ∈ rng(inv P ).
For the last statement, simply observe that v ∈ u I P ⇔ v − u ∈ I P ⇔ inv P (v − u) = 0 ⇔ inv P v = inv P u, where the second equivalence follows from (iii) and the last from the linearity of inv P .
